The majority rule and the hierarchically dictatorial rule are both characterized when preferences are defined over two alternatives. The majority rule is characterized in terms of seven axioms. The hierarchically dictatorial rule is characterized in terms of six of these seven axioms and the negation of the seventh, so each rule can be seen as obtained from the other by negating just one of the axioms. The pivotal axiom holds that, for societies with at least three members, the frequency with which indifference is the result of the preference aggregation must be smaller than the frequency with which one of the alternatives is declared preferred to the other.
Introduction
Democracy and dictatorship define two focal procedures to make a collective decision. In a democracy, every member of the collective always has the potential to influence the decision; in a dictatorship, a given member of the collective always determines the decision. Since democracy is usually associated with the adoption of some majority principle, dictatorship will be confronted with the weakest majority concept: the relative majority rule (or, for short, the majority rule).
The majority rule does not create preference cycles, as in the Condorcet paradox, when there are only two alternatives. There are several axiomatizations of the majority rule for the two-alternative case; see, for instance, May (1952, p. 682) , Fishburn (1973, p. 58), Aşan and Sanver (2002, p. 411) , Woeginger (2003, p. 91; 2005 , p. 9), Miroiu (2004 , and Xu and Zhong (2009) . This paper presents another axiomatization of the majority rule, which can be turned into an axiomatization of dictatorship by negating just one the axioms. Specifically, it is shown that majority and dictatorship satisfy the following axioms.
• Unanimity: if all the voters vote for the same candidate a, then a is the chosen candidate.
• Reducibility: the outcome of an election involving n voters can be obtained from a certain election involving n − 1 voters.
• Substitutability: in elections involving two voters i and j, a third voter k can replace i or j without altering the result of the election.
• Exchangeability: in elections involving two voters, if the result of the election differs from both i's and j's vote, then the result remains the same when i and j exchange their votes.
• Parity: for elections with two given voters, each of the three outcomes is chosen the same number of times.
• Resoluteness: for elections involving three given voters, the proportion of cases in which the outcome "tie" arises is not greater than ⅓.
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Given those axioms, majority rule arises, roughly speaking, when resoluteness rather than parity is imposed on elections involving more than two voters, whereas dictatorship emerges when it is parity rather than resoluteness that is imposed. So the emphasis on resoluteness over parity leads to majority, whereas the emphasis on parity over resoluteness leads to dictatorship.
It is worth noticing that the characterization of the majority rule does not resort to such typical axioms as neutrality, anonymity, Pareto efficiency, or monotonicity. In addition, the characterizations of majority and dictatorship seem to be paradoxical in the following sense: dictatorship emerges from a non-discriminatory treatment of all the outcomes, whereas majority derives from a discriminatory treatment of one of the outcomes (the tie).
Definitions and assumptions
Members of the set ℕ of natural numbers are names for individuals. A society is a finite non-empty subset of ℕ. There are two alternatives: A and B. A preference over {A, B} is represented by a number from the set {−1, 0, 1}. If the number is 1, A is preferred to B; if −1, B is preferred to A; if 0, A is indifferent to B. A preference profile for society I is a function x I : I → {−1, 0, 1} assigning a preference over {A, B} to each member of I.
For n ∈ ℕ, X n is the set of all preference profiles x I : I → {−1, 0, 1} such that I has n elements. The set X is the set of all preference profiles x I : I → {−1, 0, 1} such that I is a society. A member x I of X can be viewed as an election in which I is the set of voters and, for i ∈ I, x i is i's vote: if x i = 1, then i votes for candidate A; if x i = −1, then i votes for candidate B; and if x i = 0, then i's vote is a blank vote. For x I ∈ X, i ∈ I and nonempty J ⊂ I, x i abbreviates x I (i) and x J is the restriction of x I to society J. Definition 2.1. A social welfare function is a mapping f : X → {−1, 0, 1}.
A social welfare function takes as input the preferences over {A, B} of all the members of any given society I and outputs a collective preference over {A, B}. For x I ∈ X: (i) f(x I ) = 1 means that, according to f, the collective prefers A to B; (ii) f(x I ) = −1, that the collective prefers B to A; and (iii) f(x I ) = 0, that the collective is indifferent between A and B. Another interpretation is that f determines the outcome of an election x I : f(x I ) = 1 means that A is the winning candidate; f(x I ) = −1 that it is B; and f(x I ) = 0 that there is a tie between A and B.
−4− Definition 2.2. The majority rule is the social welfare function μ : X → {−1, 0, 1} such that, for all x I ∈ X: (i) if ∑ i∈I x i > 0, then μ(x I ) = 1; (ii) if ∑ i∈I x i < 0, then μ(x I ) = −1; and (iii) if ∑ i∈I x i = 0, then μ(x I ) = 0. Definition 2.3. A social welfare function f : X → {−1, 0, 1} has a hierarchy of dictators if there a linear order ⇒ on ℕ such that, for all x I ∈ X, f(x I ) = x i , where i is the member of I such that, for all j ∈ I\{i}, i ⇒ j.
UNA. Unanimity. For all x I ∈ X, if there is a ∈ {−1, 0, 1} such that, for all i ∈ I, x i = a then, f(x I ) = a.
UNA states that if all the members of a society have the same preference, then that preference constitutes the collective preference.
For x I ∈ X, i ∈ ℕ\I and a ∈ {−1, 0, 1}, (x I , a i ) designates the member y J of X such that: 
RED asserts that the result of aggregating n preferences (or of an election involving n voters) can be obtained as the result of aggregation of n − 1 preferences (or an election involving n − 1 voters). Specifically, RED holds that the preference f(x I ) can be obtained as follows. Choose any two individuals i and j whose preferences x i and x j are different.
Determine the preference f(x {i,j} ) of society {i, j}. Select a representative k ∈ {i, j} of society {i, j}. Replace, in the original aggregation problem x I , the preferences (x i , x j ) by the preference f(x {i,j} ) and ascribe f(x {i,j} ) to the representative k. Finally, compute the preference f(x {i,j} , f(x {i,j} ) k ) and make f(x I ) equal to that preference.
The condition of weak path independence in Aşan and Sanver (2002, p. 411 ) and the property of reducibility to subsocieties in Woeginger (2003, p. 90) are similar reduction properties. RED is also related to Chambers' (2008, p. 350) representative consistency, which is a condition of gerrymandering proofness. When combined with UNA, representative consistency implies that, for all x I ∈ X and J ⊂ I, f(
This says that the outcome of election x I coincides with the outcome of any election SUB. Substitutability. For all i ∈ ℕ, j ∈ ℕ\{i} and k ∈ ℕ\{i, j}, k ≡ i or k ≡ j (or both).
SUB claims that, in every aggregation problem (or election) involving just two individuals i and j, any other individual k can replace i or j without causing any change in the final result.
EXC. Exchangeability. For all i ∈ N, j ∈ N\{i} and preference profile x I for I = {i, j}, if
, where y i = x j and y j = x i .
EXC says that if the collective preference associated with a society with two individuals disagrees with the preference of each member of the society, then the same collective preference results when the individuals exchange their preferences. Both SUB and EXC can be regarded as anonymity conditions.
For society I of ℕ and a ∈ {1, 0, −1}, define π a I to be the number of preference profiles 
Results
Lemma 3.1. Let f : X → {−1, 0, 1} be a social welfare function satisfying UNA, RED, SUB, EXC, and PAR 2 . Let i ∈ ℕ, j ∈ ℕ\{i} and I = {i,
Proof. Let i ∈ ℕ and j ∈ ℕ\{i}. Suppose that f(1 i , −1 j ) = 0. There are 9 preference profiles for I = {i, j}. It must be shown that for each such preference profile
Since the number of preference profiles for I is 9, it follows from f(0 i , 0
. By PAR 2 , the remaining four
Lemma 3.2. Let f : X → {−1, 0, 1} be a social welfare function satisfying UNA, RED, SUB, EXC, and PAR 2 . If there are i ∈ ℕ and j ∈ ℕ\{i} such that f(
Proof. Let i ∈ ℕ and j ∈ ℕ\{i} satisfy f(1 i , −1 j ) = 0. It must be shown that, for all n ∈ ℕ, f = μ on X n . Case 1: n = 1. By UNA, f = μ on X 1 . Case 2: n = 2. Choose I ⊂ ℕ having two members and x I ∈ X 2 . Case 2a: that, for all t ∈ {2, … , n − 1}, f = μ on X t . To prove that f = μ on X n , choose I ⊂ ℕ having n members and x I ∈ X n . If, for some a ∈ {1, 0, −1}, all the components of x I are equal to a, then, by UNA, f(x I ) = a = μ(x I ). If two components x k and x r are different, then, by RED, for some α ∈ {k, r}, f( Table 1 By assumption, f(
, then, by PAR 2 , the value of each of the four remaining profiles ( 
Case 2 in Table 1 . Table 1 ).
then π 1 I ≥ 4/9, contradicting PAR 2 . As a result, f(0 i , 1 j ) = 0. By PAR 2 , f(−1 i , 0 j ) = 0 and Table 1 ) or f(−1 i , 0 j ) = −1 and f(0 i , −1 j ) = 0 (Case 6 in Table 1 ).
The proof amounts to reaching a contradiction from each case different from Case 6.
Choose k ∈ ℕ\{i, j}. By SUB, in both Case 1 and Case 2, f is symmetric on the domain of preference profiles for societies having two members: for all a ∈ {−1, 0, 1}, b ∈ {−1, 0, 1}, α ∈ ℕ, and β ∈ ℕ\{α}, f(a α , b
−9−
• Case 1. There are 27 preference profiles for J = {i, j, k}. By RED and the symmetry between i, j and k, f assigns the value 0 to the following nine profiles: (i) the three profiles in which two components are 0 and the third one is −1; (ii) the three profiles in which two components are −1 and the third one is 0; and (iii) the three profiles in which two components are 0 and the third one is 1. By UNA, f(0 i , 0 j , 0 k ) = 0. The conclusion is then that π 0 J ≥ 10/27, which contradicts RES 3 .
• Case 2. By RED, there are δ ∈ {i, k} and γ ∈ {j, k} such that
By symmetry between i, j and k, for all δ ∈ {i, k}, f(−1 δ , 1 j ) = 1; and, for all γ ∈ {j, k}, f(0 γ ,
Since the substitutability relation is, by definition, symmetric, having k ≡ i and j ≡ k represents the same case as having k ≡ j and i ≡ k. Summarizing, by SUB:
. This means that, for any c ∈ {3, 4, 5}, Case c in Table 1 yields the value of the corresponding profiles not only when (α, β)
Similarly, when (ii) holds, Table 1 provides the values when (α, β) = (i, j),
Lastly, when (iii) holds, Table 1 provides the values when (α, β) = (i, j),
• Case 3. Case 3a: j ≡ k and k ≡ i, so (1) holds. By RED, there are δ ∈ {i, k} and γ ∈ {j,
−10− Case 3b: j ≡ i and i ≡ k, so (2) holds. By RED, there are δ ∈ {i, j} and γ ∈ {j, k} such
Case 3c: k ≡ j and j ≡ i, so (3) holds. By RED, there are δ ∈ {i, j} and γ ∈ {j, k} such
• Case 4. Case 4a: j ≡ k and k ≡ i, so (1) holds. By RED, there are δ ∈ {i, k} and γ ∈ {j,
Case 4b: j ≡ i and i ≡ k, so (2) holds. By RED, there are δ ∈ {i, k} and γ ∈ {i, j} such
Case 4c: k ≡ j and j ≡ i, so (3) holds. By RED, there are δ ∈ {i, j} and γ ∈ {j, k} such
• Case 5. Case 5a: j ≡ k and k ≡ i, so (1) holds. By RED, there are δ ∈ {i, j} and γ ∈ {j,
Case 5b: j ≡ i and i ≡ k, so (2) holds. By RED, there are δ ∈ {i, k} and γ ∈ {i, j} such
Case 5c: k ≡ j and j ≡ i, so (3) holds. By RED, there are δ ∈ {i, j} and γ ∈ {j, k} such Proof. The proof is analogous to that of Lemma 3.3. Suppose that f(
by PAR 2 , the value of each of the four remaining profiles (
, and
This set of values defines Case 1 in Table 2 .
. This is Case 2 in Table 2 . Table 2 ). Table 2 Finally, if f(−1 i , 0
and f(0 i , 1 j ) = 0 (Case 4 in Table 2 ) or f(1 i , 0 j ) = 0 and f(0 i , 1 j ) = 1 (Case 5 in Table 2 ).
The proof amounts to deriving a contradiction from each case different from Case 6. To this end, notice that, by renaming i as j and j as i, for c ∈ {3, 4, 5}, Case c in Table 2 is the same as Case c in Table 1 . Therefore, the contradictions reached from those cases in −12− the proof of Lemma 3.3 show that Case 3, 4 and 5 cannot hold. With respect to Case 1 and Case 2, by SUB, the columns "Case 1" and "Case 2" in Table 2 are valid for all α ∈ ℕ and β ∈ ℕ\{α}. Choose k ∈ ℕ\{i, j}.
• Case 1. By RED, there are δ ∈ {i, j} and γ ∈ {j, k} such that f(f(
On the other hand, by symmetry,
• Case 2. There are 27 preference profiles for J = {i, j, k}. By RED and the symmetry between i, j and k, f assigns the value 0 to the following nine profiles: (i) the three profiles in which two components are 0 and the third one is −1; (ii) the three profiles in which two components are 1 and the third one is 0; and (iii) the three profiles in which two components are 0 and the third one is 1. By UNA, f(0 i , 0 j , 0 k ) = 0. As a consequence, π 0 J ≥ 10/27, which contradicts RES 3 .
Lemma 3.5. Let f : X → {−1, 0, 1} be a social welfare function satisfying UNA, RED, SUB, EXC, PAR 2 , and RES 3 . If there are i ∈ ℕ and j ∈ ℕ\{i} such that f(
then f has a hierarchy of dictators.
Proof. Let f satisfy UNA, RED, SUB, EXC, PAR 2 , and RES 3 . For i ∈ ℕ and j ∈ ℕ\{i}, define i → j if and only if for every preference profile x I for I = {i, j}, f(x I ) = x i . Loosely speaking, i → j means that i is a dictator in society {i, j}. Assume that, for some i ∈ ℕ and j ∈ ℕ\{i}, f(1 i , −1 j ) ≠ 0.
• Step 1: for all k ∈ ℕ and r ∈ ℕ\{k}, either k → r or k → r. Choose k ∈ ℕ and r ∈ ℕ\{k}. If f(1 k , −1 r ) = 0, then, by Lemma 3.2, f is the majority rule, contradicting f(
) ≠ 0 and, by Lemmas 3.3 and 3.4, either k → r or k → r.
•
Step 2: for all k ∈ ℕ, r ∈ ℕ\{k} and t ∈ ℕ\{r, k}, if k → r and r → t, then k → t.
Therefore, k → r and r → k, which contradicts step 1. If k ≡ r, then r → t implies k → t.
• Step 3: f has a hierarchy of dictators. By steps 1 and 2, the binary relation → defines the linear order (i 1 , i 2 , … , i n , … ) on ℕ such that i 1 → i 2 → … → i n → … It must be shown that (i 1 , i 2 , … , i n , … ) is a hierarchy of dictators in f; that is, for all x I ∈ X, f(x I ) = x i t , where t = min{r ∈ ℕ: i r ∈ I}. Case 1: I has one member. The result follows from To summarize, let f : X → {−1, 0, 1} satisfy UNA, RED, SUB, EXC, PAR 2 , and RES 3 .
Choose i ∈ ℕ and j ∈ ℕ\{i}. If f(1 i , −1 j ) = 0, then, by Lemma 3.2, f is the majority rule.
If f(1 i , −1 j ) ≠ 0, then, by Lemma 3.5, f has a hierarchy of dictators. Now, suppose that f is required to satisfy UNA, RED, SUB, EXC, PAR 2 , and RES 3 . Then: (i) if f is also required to satisfy IND, then the majority rule is obtained (Proposition 3.6); and (ii) if f is required not to satisfy IND, then a hierarchy of dictators emerges (Proposition 3.7).
Hence, in the context defined by UNA, RED, SUB, EXC, PAR 2 , and RES 3 , the difference between the majority rule and the hierarchically dictatorial rule can be reduced to choosing to concede to the indifference the same status given to the strict preference.
Proposition 3.6. A social welfare function f : X → {−1, 0, 1} satisfies UNA, RED, SUB, EXC, PAR 2 , RES 3 , and IND if and only if f is the majority rule.
Proof. "⇐" It should not be difficult to verify that f satisfies UNA, RED, SUB, EXC, PAR 2 , RES 3 , and IND when f is the majority rule. "⇒" Let f satisfy UNA, RED, SUB, EXC, PAR 2 , RES 3 , and IND. Choose i ∈ ℕ and j ∈ ℕ\{i}. Case 1: f(1 i , −1 j ) ≠ 0. By
